

27 October 1954

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Question: What effects will the implementation of the [REDACTED] Report in USIA and State have on the CIA intelligence area? (Also touch very briefly on current status of study on NIS Financing and assignment of international communism)

Increased Intelligence Support of USIA by CIA:

The USIA Survey called for the provision to USIA of national intelligence and CIA intelligence and information. The USIA Survey also established a list of the types of intelligence and intelligence information needed by USIA against which CIA (and other agencies) could disseminate. The NSC has designated USIA as a recipient of national intelligence subject to IAC determination. The clearing of national intelligence and its dissemination to USIA is handled by procedures already established. Tab A of the USIA Survey listed certain intelligence publications to be provided USIA. At present, OCD/LD is screening CIA intelligence and intelligence information according to the requirements established by the Survey. This intelligence will be disseminated to USIA subject to the consent of the originator with regard to the protection of his sources and methods. This function of providing CIA materials is handled by present procedures and personnel. A practice screening both from current take and, via intellofax, from the library has been completed and consultations with the originators regarding protection of sources and methods are underway. The USIA Survey also called for covert reporting of "descriptive detail". Instructions to the covert field organization have been sent, but at present no increase in reporting has been reflected.

Participation by USIA in Certain IAC Intelligence Programs:

The USIA Survey called for participation by USIA in the pertinent activities of the IAC subcommittee on basic intelligence, on defectors and foreign language publications. The major function of USIA's participation in the activities of these

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three subcommittees and their programs is one of coordination. While USIA's participation in certain NIS committee activities is one of coordination of USIA's requirements, there may be an increase in the editorial responsibility of ORR's basic intelligence division resulting from increased NIS production by State as called for by the USIA Survey. Participation by USIA in the Interagency Defector Committee will permit USIA to exploit, when possible, defections from behind the Iron Curtain. Such exploitation of the defections or the information from defectors essentially is a correction of the earlier uncoordinated relationship. USIA's participation in the NSCID 16 Committee on Foreign Language Publications and its three subcommittees on procurement, reference, and exploitation will avoid duplication by USIA of these existing assets and also provide for utilization by the intelligence community of the USIA and USIS capabilities.

Provision by USIA of Certain Intelligence to CIA:

The USIA Survey called for reporting by USIS (in coordination with State Department). This reporting is not yet underway, although initial steps have been taken. CIA already receives copies of USIS reports and any increased take as a result of new USIS reporting will be handled by present procedures and personnel.

NIS Financing:

The USIA Survey indicated that there would be a reexamination of the [REDACTED] and a subsequent letter to the Department of State established 15 February 1955 as a target date for the completion of such reexamination. This reexamination is now in progress within the Agency and it is expected when that is concluded discussions with the State Department and the Bureau of the Budget will be undertaken.

Assignment of International Communism:

In calling for increased intelligence production, principally under the NIS program by State, the USIA Survey recommended increased production on international communism. The Director has asked the SA/PC/DCI to negotiate with State as to the proper location (State or CIA) of the responsibility for

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the production of intelligence on international communism. Should the responsibility continue to be located in State, no new positions will be called for in CIA, but [REDACTED] by CIA for NIS production will be increased. Should all or part of the responsibility be placed in CIA, new positions will be required to augment the present production by the International Communism Branch of staff C. The exact location in CIA for such production in the event all or part of the responsibility is placed in CIA has not been decided.

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Question 2: Is the [REDACTED] Study on Foreign Propaganda Analysis Far Enough Advanced to Discuss?

The USIA Survey referred to a separate examination of the relationship of foreign propaganda analysis to other intelligence support. Interest in foreign propaganda analysis has been heightened due to police measures in the Soviet Orbit restricting the flow of other information useful for intelligence purposes. In 1949, 50 and 51, [REDACTED] produced a three volume report on this subject. In brief, this report described the history of foreign propaganda analysis by the FCC during World War II and made recommendations for the increased description and analysis of foreign propaganda. Current consideration of foreign propaganda analysis includes the [REDACTED] study, FBID's current production, as well as production by OIR/State, OCI, FDD and the reactions and requirements of consumers. A major problem in considering the responsibilities for and the techniques of foreign propaganda analysis concerns analysis based on all sources including actions of foreign government vs. the analysis of that propaganda with little or no reference to other sources. Proponents of the latter method of analysis feel that foreign propaganda based on radio and press reflects actions of foreign governments via public announcements and that experience has shown that inferences as to a country's intentions can be drawn from this source. They also recommended that such analysis must properly be tested eventually against other intelligence analyses which include consideration of other sources. On the other hand, the majority of those responsible for intelligence production (political) based on all sources including actions of foreign governments insists that foreign propaganda analysis not so conducted is out of context and erroneous. They state further that they have accumulated sufficient experience to prove their point. Another problem which arises to complicate the study of foreign propaganda analysis is a problem of semantics. For example, on the one hand, the [REDACTED] study and certain of its readers recommend that more inferences can and should be drawn from radio and press monitoring, while on the other hand others who have read the [REDACTED] study and are either familiar with or currently use the present press and radio reports feel that those reports already constitute adequate content analysis.

Identification of the techniques of content analysis and the determination of where, if they exist, they functionally belong has not yet been concluded.

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